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A common premise in conservative arguments on the morality of
abortion is that the nonviable fetus has a right to life - and a common
reaction to such arguments is puzzlement. Much of the puzzlement is
over what is meant by saying that the nonviable fetus "has a right to
life." Moreover, attempts at explaining the meaning of this phrase
have generally failed to bring its intuitive sense to the surface. I think
that this situation can be improved somewhat. I will suggest an explication of "the fetus has a right to life" which I think is both adequate
to the conservative's usage of the phrase and useful to his cause,
although the premise so construed will not do all of the work in moral
arguments he wishes it to. Before presenting this explication I will
mention several previously offered and, I think, unsatisfactory analyses.
Some individuals contend that "The fetus has a right to life" means
"The fetus ought never to be killed." But if this is what is meant by
"having a right to life," then not even every adult human being has
such a right. I think that there are conceivable cases of legitimate
killing, the clearest being killing in defense of one's own life or the
killing involved in waging a just war. However, if having a right to life
means that one ought never to be killed, and if person x may sometimes be killed justly, then it follows that person x does not have a
right to life. But surely any explication must be inadequate which,
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together with true premises, supports the conclusion that not all persons have a "right to life." It seems that if there are any fundamental
rights at all, which all individuals who are persons must have simply
because they are persons, then a "right to life" must be one such right.
Perhaps the initial suggestion ought to be broadened; perhaps what
is meant by saying "The fetus has a right to life" is "The fetus ought
never to be killed except in defense of some person's life." This I
consider unsatisfactory because of my convictions on the following
case. Suppose nation A is determined to conquer nation B and to
enslave B's population for economic purposes. If the citizens of B do
not resist, there will be no bloodshed; A wants to enslave B, not
annihilate B. I think that the citizens of B have a right to resist;
further, if deaths of members of A's armed forces result from B's
resistance, I do not think that any "right to life" has been violated.
But if such deaths are justified, it is not because they were caused in
defense of any persons' lives, but rather in defense of property, of the
right of self-governance, and so forth. The proposed analysis of "having a right to life" is inadequate because it makes B's resistance with
force a violation of the right to life of some of the citizens of A.
Perhaps, then, we ought further to broaden the notion of "self-defense" to include a host of instances in which killing is justified.
Roughly, to say "The fetus has a right to life" would then be to say
"The fetus ought not to be killed except in 'self-defense'-where
'self-defense' is construed so broadly as to include 'defense of one's
own manner of living.' " There would be several objections to such an
explication. First, conservatives are surely to reject it as opening the
way to dangerous decisions concerning "justified" killing of persons.
But a more pointed objection for our purpose is that such an explication is not at all helpful for the sort of job conservatives want the
concept of "having a right to life" to do. Under this explication, one
would need a somewhat detailed listing of the conditions under which
killing is justified. But the current debate on the morality of abortion
is precisely a debate over the contents of this list! Obviously one could
not, without circularity, appeal to such a right to life in order to
justify the setting of those conditions. But this is how conservatives
are wont to argue: "Killing a nonviable human fetus is immoral (unjustified) because that fetus has a right to life."
Finally, some have suggested that what is meant by "The fetus has a
right to life" is "The fetus has the right to be given at least the bare
minimum that it needs for continued life." 1 But do even adult human
beings have such a right? We certainly have a right to refuse some
claims of others on our goods or services, even though the claims are
made on the basis of actual need. If not, the demands upon our
personal resources, in the name of someone else's "right to life,"
would be endless. I know of no one who does not weigh his or her
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own manner of living against the continued bare existence of others
and who does not sometimes choose (morally, I think) to maintain the
former at the loss of the latter.
This is not to say that claims to the bare minimum are never justified, but merely to say that they are not automatically justified due to
the claimant's possession of a "right to life." And if we were to
broaden the explication to "The fetus has the right to be given at least
the bare minimum that it needs and deserves for continued life ," we
have an account that is objectionable on a basis similar to that for
which the third proposal above was found to be wanting: we still lack
an account of the conditions under which the bare minimum is deserved and claims about fetal right to life, so construed, are not going
to be helpful in setting the contents of that account. Any appeal to
fetal right to life in the process of setting those conditions will be a
logically otious move, for nothing that is not vacuously true will thereby be established. And premises about fetal right to life will not be
able to ground substantive conclusions about the morality of abortion
without begging important moral issues.
Conditions of Adequacy
None of these proposed explications, now familiar to all of us ,
adequately captures the sense of "The fetus has a right to life." However, the discussion has been useful in that two conditions of adequacy can be formulated. The first is : a "right to life" would seem to
be a right that every person has as person, and no explication can be
acceptable which does not do justice to this universality. Given any
explication of "having a right to life," if I cannot agree that every
person, as person, has such a right, I must conclude that no person, as
person, has such a right. Therefore, if there is meaning to "having a
right to life," the given explication has failed to capture it.
The second condition of adequacy is the following : any proffered
explication ought to be rejected which makes central c onservative
arguments containing it obviously circular or vacuous. This is simply a
heuristic canon of good criticism: it is better to attest to the lack of an
explication than first to assume that one understands the meaning of a
key phrase and then to urge that the argument containing the phrase is
faulty due to the meaning assigned. Obviously this canon does not
apply in the case of a phrase whose meaning is clear or noncontroversial. But were the meaning clear or noncontroversial, we would not be
as concerned with explication as we a,re. If our research is generated
by genuine desire to understand, then lack of success at explication
should not convince us that this is the best we can do .
However, it is true that the persistent rejection of proposed analyses
does not provide an account of what is being claimed when the fetus is
said to have a "right to life." We must try to say what is meant more
clearly.
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I suggest that the claim "The fetus has a right to life" may be
usefully analyzed into (at least) two quite different sorts of claims. The
first sort of claim is about membership in the set of persons, while the
second sort is about the treatment of members of the set of persons.
The key claim of the first sort is that "The fetus is presumptively a
person." By this I mean that there is reason to believe that the fetus
has a right to be presumed a person unless or until proved otherwise.
Or, alternatively, it is the claim that there is some reason for thinking
that the fetus has a prima facie right to be classified as a person. It is a
claim about a prima facie right of fetuses to be considered members of
the set of persons for basic moral considerations. With this explanation in mind I will suggest that "The fetus has a right to life" be taken
to entail "The fetus is presumptively a person."
This is a useful analysis in that it enables us to make sense of some
otherwise troublesome arguments brought in favor of a conservative
position on abortion-arguments whose intelligibility is often questioned.
For example, some conservatives profess to understand the suggestion that the fetus might be a person although we might never know
for certain. They appear to treat the question of assessing personhood
as a matter of recognizing some brute fact and they seem to think that
classification is a process totally independent of conceptual frameworks and societal decisions. Thus construed, the intelligibility of the
conservative position rests heavily on the intelligibility of an epistemological realism. Their opponents contend that it is nonsense to
think that there is a hard line drawn "in nature" between persons and
non-persons, any more than there is a line drawn "in nature" between
living and non-living. (Indeed, we find the same metaphysical debate
behind the is~ue of whether death is "an event or a process."2) What is
unfortunate about this approach to the question of fetal personhood
is that a barrier of intelligibility is erected between the differing
parties. It is not merely that they disagree, but rather that each finds
the position of the other unintelligible. 3
It seems unacceptable that we should leave the fate of human
fetuses adrift on such open metaphysical waters. What is more, this
direction is the result of a needless tack in the abortion debate. The
conservative claim that the fetus might be a person becomes more
intelligible when it is construed as the claim that the fetus is presumptively a person, that the fetus has a right to be classified and treated as
a person until good reason is brought forward for treating the fetus
otherwise. I believe that this is essentially the claim that the conservative is trying to make good; but in making such a claim there is no
need for dependence upon epistemological realism. If a certain conservative is also an advocate of such an epistemological theory and wishes
to remain one, that is another matter. But the mere suspicion that the
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fetus "might be" a person may well be an expression of the concern,
not that the fetus's "nature" is not being "perceived correctly," but
that a prima facie fetal right is being violated without due justification.
On the proposed entailment, we can also make better sense of conservative arguments that run roughly as follows: if we begin to decide
questions about personhood merely on the basis of an individual's
actual (as opposed to potential) characteristics and abilities, then the
way is opened for declaring individuals not to be persons whenever
their behavior or capability falls below an acceptable level. How, the
conservative argues, will this line of "acceptability" be drawn? How
will the liberal proceed when, considering an individual in the final
stages of life, there seems to be both diminishing activity and a closing
off of the potential for ever regaining lost capabilities? But when this
fear is framed as an argument, the result (when viewed as a preview of
societal practice) strikes liberals as assuming that the slope is more
slippery than it really is and the argument (when viewed from the
standpoint of logic) earns from liberals the rebuttal that an acorn
simply is not an oak tree and therefore need not be treated as such.
Interpretative Difficulties
Again, difficulties arise due to a given interpretation of the conservative position and some (but not all) of the heat generated in the
resulting debate is avoidable. I believe that the conservative is contending that while the fetus is clearly not an adult human person, it does
have certain characteristics that justify treating it as a person with
respect to certain basic rights (a point which we will discuss in a
moment). Some conservatives conceptualize this situation by appealing to the distinction between "actuality" and "potentiality," contending that of the generally accepted characteristics of adult human
persons the fetus "actually" has some and possesses the others "potentially." Many liberals· find this a hopelessly useless intrusion of
metaphysics and consider characteristics that are "had potentially" by
the fetus as simply not had at all. 4
What is germane here is to contend that conservative arguments
about "potential" need not be framed within a metaphysics of act and
potency. The conservative position may be construed as the claim that
the fetus (and, presumably, the individual in the final stages of life)
has a prima facie right to be included in the class of persons, with all
the rights such membership involves.
What reason is there to think that the fetus really has such a prima
facie right? The reasoning seems to be that the fetus has certain characteristics, and that anything so characterized must be presumed to be
a person unless good reason is brought forward for classifying it otherwise. These characteristics are purely biological: the fetus is an embodied member of the human species, the product of a sexual union
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of two (clear) members of that species, and possessed of the genetic
requirements both for individuality and for species membership. The
conservative believes that this is surely a sufficient condition for claiming a prima facie right to personhood.
I think it unfortunate that conservatives have ever thought that
such arguments from "embodiment" adequately support the claim
that the fetus is a person. This is, at best, a weak argument and their
claim to be able to prove fetal personhood has been quite legitimately
challenged. (That this is a tactical error is evidenced by the reception
such an approach has received in the courts in recent years.) But
"arguments from embodiment" provide far better support for a
weaker conclusion: the fetus has a right to be presumed a person until
good reason is brought to classify the fetus otherwise. One extremely
important advantage of this latter conclusion over the former is that it
is compatible with the claim that the concept of "person " is not
definable (either at present or in principle) by means of a set of
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Indeed, the proponent of
the weaker conclusion need not even claim to have a set of sufficient
conditions for personhood. What he does claim to be able to do is
recognize cases wherein sufficient conditions are met for establishing a
peculiar sort of prima facie right: a right to be classed as a person in a
provisional way. No strong claims of any sort are being advanced
concerning the "actual membership" of the class of persons "in nature."
A second characteristic of the weaker, better supported conclusion
(and a characteristic that ought to make it acceptable to conservatives)
is that it is a sufficiently strong conclusion for the conservative's purposes. It may prove difficult to establish that fetuses are not persons,
or to establish that the prima facie right of fetuses to person status
ought to be overridden; in any case, the burden of proof, it seems to
me, lies with those who would wish to classify fetuses otherwise and
not with those who advocate fetal rights.
It is time to return to the analysis begun somewhat earlier when it
was proposed that an entailment of the first sort (concerning membership in the set of persons) is " The fetus is presumptively a person." I
will now suggest an example of the other sort of entailment - the sort
of entailment which deals with what is meant by "being a person" and
with how persons ought to be treated. I do not intend to survey here
the extensive literature on this topic. However, an entailment important in the context of the debate about "having a right to life" is''Any
person has a prima facie right not to be killed ." This prima facie right
is one shared by all things classified as persons precisely because they
are classified as persons. Such a right can be overridden (that is why it
is only a prima facie right), but the exception ("This person may be
killed") is in need of justification, not the rule ("Persons ought not to
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be killed"). That persons have the prima facie right not to be killed is,
conservatives think, a self-evident matter following on the very notion
of personhood. What cases of justified killing of persons have in common is that the burden of proof of the legitimacy of the killing lies
with the individual who takes life and not with the victim.
Conservatives' Claim
This then is what some conservatives may be claiming when they
premise that the fetus has a right to life: there is reason to presume
the fetus a person until good reason is brought forward for classifying
the fetus otherwise and until and unless such good reasons are forthcoming the fetus ought to be presumed to have a prima facie right not
to be killed. It can be seen that this analysis meets the conditions of
adequacy mentioned earlier: clearly every person has a "right to life"
(so construed) and the statement "X ought not to be killed because x
has a right to life" is not analytically true.
If this expresses what the conservative is claiming, then I find the
premise understandable and reasonable. However, it may be questioned whether conservatives have always made proper use of such a
premise in argumentation over abortion. Many uses of the premise
systematically elicit a residual puzzlement that remains even after puzzlement over the meaning of the claim is dispelled. This is understandable when it is seen that, given the above meaning analysis, such
a premise seldom supports all that some conservatives wish it to support. Making good the claim that the fetus has a right to life does not
directly settle the morality of any abortion, any more than claims
about the right to life of combatants can settle the morality of the
killing that occurred in the course of World War II. In particular, the
claim that "All persons have a prima facie right not to be killed" is not
itself any more useful in directly settling a particular case than is the
claim that "No person ought to be killed except in 'self-defense' (construed broadly)." We still lack clear knowledge of the conditions
under which the prima facie right may be morally overridden.

But I would argue that the conservative is, on the whole, making a
more useful and more pointed claim than merely that "fetuses ought
not to be killed unjustly," even though he is not properly claiming so
much as will enable him to deal directly with all the questions he
wishes to address. On my account, the additional, useful claims concern the initial or presumptive classification of fetuses as persons and
address the question of where the burden of argument rests regarding
(1) possible reclassification of the fetus and (2) treatment of those
classified as persons. As such, claims about fetal right to life are important assertions about the rules under which some basic and fundamental moral questions about the treatment of fetuses should be
settled. So construed, however, claims about fetal right to life do not
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in themselves make direct logical contact with the question of whether
abortion is ever moral: they rather perform the important task of
assigning moral responsibilities to those participating in the debate.
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